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Of all the requisite components of a market economy in transition
and emerging countries, sound legal systems and institutions have been
among the slowest to develop. In recognition of this fact, in August 1998,
as the Russian ﬁnancial crisis was unfolding, this author presented a
paper at The Aspen Institute Program on the World Economy setting out
“Guiding Principles and Core Requirements for a Legal System in a
Market Economy.”1 The underlying premise of the “Guiding Principles”
is that the awesome complexity and dynamism of a market economy
require laws, rules, and norms, based on transparency and openness, that
encourage and facilitate economic interchange and at the same time take
into account the fact that some degree of governmental intervention in
the “free” market is also required, because market participants are human
and thus not perfect.
In a market economy, a legal and regulatory framework must
support decentralized economic decision-making by market participants
based on market prices derived in arm’s length interchanges and not
based on collusion, corruption, nepotism, or cronyism. The cooperation
and conﬁdence that are required for a market economy to operate
efﬁciently and effectively can exist only if a well-developed legal and
regulatory framework exists. A market economy is based on the efforts of
countless individuals. Yet, for a market economy to operate efﬁciently
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(5/1998). A copy of the Guiding Principles is included as an appendix to this paper.and effectively, these individual market participants must share a com-
mon interest, based on an expectation of fairness and merit-based
economic decision-making. Such expectation is grounded in a rule of law
that is rooted in a “culture of law”—a culture that supports the rule of law
and opposes corruption, and a culture in which the law is enforced by
credible and honest authorities in a manner that inspires public conﬁ-
dence in the law and respect for the intentions and the institutions of the
law. Rule of law that has at its core concepts of fairness and meritocracy
will nurture this culture of law.
This paper will review and analyze the development of the legal and
regulatory framework in six emerging or transition countries: Thailand,
Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, China, and Russia. Fifteen core require-
ments for a legal system in a market economy are set out in the Guiding
Principles. While a comprehensive analysis would focus on each of these
core requirements, this paper will focus only on four areas: (i) bankruptcy
law, which addresses defaults and restructurings; (ii) the law of security
interests (“secured transactions law”), which protects the rights of
creditors through pledges of assets from debtors; (iii) the development of
the judicial system, which allows contracts to be enforced; and (iv) the
development of banking regulation and supervision, which assures the
stability and integrity of the ﬁnancial system through which the market
mechanism operates.
These four areas were selected for review and analysis because each
is a critical component of the infrastructure that supports the ﬁnancial
system of a market economy, the “central nervous system” through
which the market mechanism operates to convert the value judgments of
market participants into prices of goods and services and ﬁnancial
instruments. An effective banking system is at the center of the ﬁnancial
system of a market economy. The banking system channels savings to
effective uses through the credit decision-making process. Market econ-
omies require the money-creating mechanism provided by banks through
the extension of credits based on real economic activity, and not that
provided by central banks through the inﬂationary printing of money.
Without the money multiplier effect that results from bank lending,
economic activity will not grow rapidly. But bank lending must be
determined by market forces and not by state planners or cronyism. The
four areas of law that will be reviewed and analyzed in this paper
provide the foundation for such bank lending.
Experience, education, and technology induce continuous changes in
the relative productivity and value of economic inputs, resulting in what
the economist Joseph Schumpeter referred to as “creative destruction” in
a market economy that continuously reallocates property rights. The four
areas of law that are the focus of this paper are essential for such
reallocation of property rights. The market mechanism must allow such
adjustments and reallocations of economic inputs, which are not painless
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them. In a state-planned economy, the changing value of economic inputs
is not reﬂected in price adjustments determined in the market, and state
bureaucrats will be generally resistant to the forces of creative destruc-
tion. As a result, over time, state-planned economies will become less and
less competitive with market economies.
The paradox of creative destruction is that it results in renewal of the
market economy, which has the ﬂexibility and strength to adjust to
changes. This renewal is based on innovation, risk-taking, and competi-
tion, all of which must be supported and encouraged by the legal and
regulatory framework. Western market economies experience incremen-
tal creative destruction with a well-developed rule of law. In the
transition and emerging economies, wholesale and rapid creative de-
struction must occur within a poorly developed rule of law. Obviously,
this will be a disruptive process. And with a poorly developed rule of
law, the process will inevitably result in corruption, which will be stiﬂing
to the entrepreneurial efforts of many market participants.
This paper will brieﬂy examine the causes of the ﬁnancial crises in
East Asia and Russia in order to set the backdrop for analysis. It will then
survey these four areas of law in the six countries. The legal survey is not
intended to be a deﬁnitive description of the law in the six countries but
rather is intended to provide a legal overview, to serve as a basis for
analysis of how the status of the legal and regulatory framework in these
six countries affected their economies during the ﬁnancial crises.
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISES
The ﬁnancial contagion that swept East Asia beginning in the
summer of 1997 was the result of economic and institutional factors. The
Asian ﬁnancial crisis was not the direct result of a weak legal and
regulatory framework.
The principal economic factors behind the Asian ﬁnancial crisis were
the very high domestic savings relative to the size of the respective
economies, combined with a very large inﬂow of foreign capital. Strong
economic growth, low government deﬁcits, high savings, and stable
currency exchange rates had encouraged the inﬂow of foreign direct
investment and the buildup of short-term external debt. In 1996, over
$160 billion of net private capital ﬂowed into East Asia. Overinvestment
resulted in inefﬁcient allocation of capital. The East Asian economies
could not provide adequate proﬁtable opportunities at reasonable risk to
absorb the domestic and foreign investment funds. This was manifested
in a booming stock market and inﬂated real estate prices, causing
speculative bubbles in equity and real estate markets. Further, capital was
often allocated at the direction of governments.
At the same time, overvalued currency exchange rates caused a
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account deﬁcits that were ﬁnanced in large part by short-term external
debt. External economic factors also played a signiﬁcant role. The
Japanese recession contributed to the decline in exports, and the depre-
ciation of the Japanese yen against East Asian currencies reduced the
competitiveness of Asian goods in the important Japanese market and
also decreased the attractiveness of East Asia as a place for Japanese
companies to produce goods. East Asian countries ran up large trade
deﬁcits in 1996 (South Korea, $23 billion; Thailand, $15 billion; Indonesia,
$7.5 billion) and incurred increasing unhedged, short-term indebtedness
denominated in foreign currency. In June 1997, South Korea had close to
$120 billion of foreign debts and less than $40 billion of foreign exchange
reserves; Thailand had about $90 billion of foreign debts and about $30
billion of foreign exchange reserves; and Indonesia had about $115 billion
of foreign debts and $20 billion of foreign exchange reserves. By contrast,
Taiwan had virtually no foreign debt and about $90 billion of foreign
exchange reserves.2
The institutional factors behind the Asian ﬁnancial crisis were ﬁxed
currency exchange rate systems—which ultimately collapsed—and weak
ﬁnancial systems with lax supervisory regimes. Downward pressures on
currency exchange rates caused foreign creditors to demand payment on
their short-term, foreign-currency-denominated loans, which led to fur-
ther weakness as debtors sold local currency to make such payments.
This vicious spiral downward caused the ﬁxed exchange rate systems to
collapse. Weak, poorly supervised ﬁnancial systems allowed systemic
mismatching of assets and liabilities and excessive foreign currency and
market risks.
These economic and institutional factors contributed to growing
ﬁnancial turbulence. The abandonment of ﬁxed currency exchange rates,
the demands for repayment of the high levels of unhedged, short-term
external debt, the declining demand for exports, and the weak ﬁnancial
systems transformed such ﬁnancial turbulence into the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis. The “herd” instinct took over and creditors and investors exited the
region, together and at the same time. Little institutional infrastructure
was available to contain the crisis, which spiraled out of control.
The ﬁnancial crisis in Russia that began in August 1998 was caused
by entirely different factors than the ﬁnancial crisis in East Asia. Russia’s
ﬁnancial crisis was caused by the collapse of its ﬁscal system. The
infrastructure for tax collection in Russia was woefully inadequate, there
were incentives not to pay taxes, and a “culture of nonpayment” had
descended from the Soviet days, during which it was accepted conduct to
2 Ellick Liao, Financial Reform in Asia, presentation at 2000 Harvard Asia Business
Conference, Harvard Business School (Jan. 28, 2000) (on ﬁle with author).
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government had insufﬁcient resources to run a credible government. In
1999, on a per capita basis, the Russian government spent the equivalent
of roughly $1 for every $35 the U.S. government spent.
The collapse of the ﬁscal system caused the banking system to fail.
The assets on the balance sheets of Russian banks consisted predomi-
nantly of Russian government securities, and the banks had extensive
off-balance-sheet foreign exchange exposure. With the default by the
Russian government and the currency devaluation in August 1998,
caused by the government’s lack of ﬁscal resources, the banking system
immediately, and inevitably, failed. The ﬁscal crisis brought down the
banking system. One great irony is that transactions in the government
securities market, which is a very important component of a market
economy, caused the failure of the banking system. The failure of the
Russian banking system does not reﬂect a failure of ﬁnancial system
reform efforts in Russia.
It has been recognized that “sound macro-policies were an abso-
lutely necessary, but not remotely sufﬁcient, condition for sustained
growth and rising living standards.”3 A developed legal and regulatory
framework and a well-supervised and regulated ﬁnancial system are
necessary for sustained growth. While a poorly developed legal and
regulatory framework was not the proximate cause of the ﬁnancial crises
in East Asia and Russia, once the crises began, the weakness in legal
systems meant that important tools to contain the crises and to work to
restore ﬁnancial stability and conﬁdence were not available. Thus, the
magnitude of the ﬁnancial crises was ampliﬁed. The discussion that
follows presents evidence of the weaknesses in legal and regulatory
frameworks in East Asia and Russia.
THAILAND
Bankruptcy Law
Enacted in 1940, the Thai bankruptcy law was inadequate for the
modern economic system that had developed in Thailand.4 Under the
law, no provision existed for the reorganization of insolvent enterprises.
Moreover, the law prevented a creditor from recovering funds lent to a
debtor if the creditor knew at the time it made the loan that the debtor
faced a risk of insolvency.5 Creditors, therefore, refused to provide funds
3 Change and Prosperity: The Aspen Institute Program on the World Economy, 1999
Conference Report 4 (Aug. 18-21, 1999).
4 David T. Gibbons, Bankruptcy in Thailand, Com. L. Bull. (1996).
5 Economist Intelligence Unit [hereinafter “EIU”] Country Analysis (Thailand), Acqui-
sition of an Existing Firm 2.2 (Dec. 30, 1999).
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made business rehabilitation virtually impossible.7 The law also expressly
prohibited the ranking of creditors in the event of bankruptcy or
liquidation.8
Liquidation of enterprises was so cumbersome and lengthy that
creditors rarely obtained recovery.9 In theory, a creditor would petition
the civil court for a ﬁnding of insolvency against a debtor. Upon such a
ﬁnding, a government-employed receiver (the equivalent of a bankruptcy
trustee in the United States) would liquidate the debtor’s assets. In
practice, however, creditors faced laborious paperwork in identifying
assets and ﬁling for liquidation.10 Further, a petitioning creditor was
required (i) to protect the interests of all other creditors that joined the
suit and (ii) to pay all court costs as well as the costs of assisting the
receiver in disposing of property.11 In addition, debtors could prolong
bankruptcy proceedings for years by obtaining repeated adjournments of
court hearings.12 Some bankruptcy cases in Thailand have continued for
more than 20 years.13 Such difﬁculties were compounded by the lack of a
specialized bankruptcy court14 and too few receivers.15 By the time
judgment was secured, few, if any, assets of the debtor remained to be
recovered. Not surprisingly, creditors rarely utilized the Thai bankruptcy
regime.
In 1998, Thailand enacted a new bankruptcy law that addressed
many of the ﬂaws of the previous bankruptcy law. The bankruptcy law
now permits creditors to force reorganization on insolvent ﬁrms.16 A
creditor, a debtor, or a state agency can submit a reorganization plan, and
the plan will be implemented upon the approval of a majority of a
debtor’s creditors.17 The 1998 law also established a specialized bank-
ruptcy court18 and removed the provisions of the previous law that had
prevented a creditor from recovering funds lent to a debtor if the creditor
6 James A. Goodman, Travels in Thailand: A Report on the Thailand Bankruptcy Project,
Am. Bankr. Inst. J. (1997).
7 1998 Investment Climate Statement for Thailand, Int’l Mkt. Insight Reports A.4 (June 18,
1998).
8 Nicholas Moller, How to Protect Lenders on Thai Projects, 12 Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 5 (1999).
9 Thailand: Breaking the Logjam: Pending Reform of Bankruptcy Law, Int’l Mkt. Insight
Reports 1 (March 2, 1998).
10 Surviving Bankruptcy, The Nation (Bangkok) (Oct. 13, 1997).
11 Breaking the Logjam, supra note 9, at 3.
12 Surviving Bankruptcy, supra note 10.
13 EIU Country Reports (Thailand), Industry (Sept. 8, 1997).
14 Gibbons, supra note 4.
15 Breaking the Logjam, supra note 9, at 2.
16 EIU ViewsWire, Thailand Economy: Recalcitrant Debtors Tarnish Reform Record (Dec. 16,
1999).
17 Moller, supra note 8.
18 1998 Investment Climate Statement for Thailand, supra note 7, at A.4.
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insolvency.19
Secured Transactions Law
While Thai law permits pledges of personal property and mortgag-
es,20 Thailand has no registration system for the recording of security
interests in personal property.21 Loans cannot be secured by accounts
receivable.22 Thai law does not recognize security interests in property
that remains in the debtor’s possession.23 In the absence of a modern
secured transactions system, creditors frequently have relied on personal
guarantees.
Judicial System
The judiciary in Thailand is well-known for its independence and it
has vigorously defended its powers from encroachment by the executive
and the legislative branches of government. Together with the civil
service, the judiciary is commonly viewed “as the only point of stability
in a volatile political system.”24 Judges, who enjoy substantial status in
Thai society, undergo a rigorous examination process in order to gain
entrance to the judiciary.25 (This is in marked contrast to the United
States, for instance, where judges are appointed or elected to their
positions.)
While Thailand’s legal system in 1997 was nearing world-class
standards for the protection of property and contract rights, enforcement
continued to be a problem.26 And the legal process could be extremely
costly and time-consuming (as illustrated by the bankruptcy process).
Critics also point to the ability of litigants to affect judgments through
extra-judicial means, such as by coercion or bribery outside the court-
room.27 Thai courts do not recognize judgments of foreign courts
(although such judgments are admissible as evidence in Thai legal
proceedings).28
19 EIU Financing Foreign Operations, Acquisition of an Existing Firm 2.2 (Dec. 30, 1999).
20 Moller, supra note 8.
21 Goodman, supra note 6.
22 AP Worldstream (Jan. 20, 1998).
23 Moller, supra note 8.
24 EIU Investing Licensing & Trading (Thailand), The Operating Environment 1.1 (Dec. 1,
1995).
25 1998 Investment Climate Statement for Thailand, supra note 7, at A.7.
26 Id.
27 Id. at A.4.
28 Moller, supra note 8.
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Deregulation in Thailand’s ﬁnancial system in the early 1990s
resulted in large inﬂows of foreign capital into the country. According to
the U.S. Treasury Department, Thailand’s failure to adequately supervise
its banking system in the face of these capital inﬂows “contributed
greatly” to the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis.29
In 1997, rather than addressing issues relating to capital inﬂows, the
Bank of Thailand, the Thai central bank, was attempting to repair its
reputation. The Bank of Thailand earlier had been considered the
architect of Thailand’s ﬁnancial stability.30 In 1996, however, its reputa-
tion was damaged by revelations that its governor had acquired shares in
a struggling ﬁnance and securities ﬁrm that the Bank of Thailand had
been supporting. The ensuing scandal led to the resignations of both the
Bank’s governor and its deputy governor.31 As a result, by the time of the
1997 ﬁnancial crisis, the Bank of Thailand had lost much of the prestige
and trust that are so essential for the effective management of the
ﬁnancial system.
During the 1990s, Thailand had gradually deregulated its banking
system in an effort to turn Bangkok into a major ﬁnancial center for
Southeast Asia. In 1993, the government launched the Bangkok Interna-
tional Banking Facility (BIBF), which permitted domestic and foreign
banks to operate international banking facilities in Thailand. The BIBF
program, in particular, contributed to the inﬂow of foreign capital into
Thailand.32
Foreign banks were prevented from opening more than three
branches in Thailand. Generally, only one of these branches could be
located in Bangkok. Each foreign bank’s Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS) capital adequacy ratio and legal lending limit were based on
the bank’s locally held capital instead of the consolidated capital of the
bank. This constrained the activities of foreign banks, which possessed
much smaller local capital bases than domestic banks. However, the
government began to allow foreign banks to participate more broadly in
the banking sector. In late 1996, for example, the BIBFs of several foreign
banks were upgraded to full branch status.33 The 25 percent ceiling on
foreign ownership of the shares of a domestic bank was raised in
29 Thailand: Banking, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, National Treatment Study 471 (1998)
[hereinafter “Thailand National Treatment Study”].
30 EIU Country Proﬁles (Thailand), Economic Infrastructure (Oct. 10, 1997).
31 EIU Business Reports, Banks (May 27, 1996).
32 Thailand National Treatment Study, supra note 29, at 470-471.
33 EIU Country Proﬁles (Thailand), Economic Infrastructure (Dec. 24, 1996).
38 John L. WalkerNovember 1997 to permit foreign investors to hold majority ownership of
a domestic bank with the approval of the Ministry of Finance.34
No deposit insurance systems existed in Thailand. However, trou-
bled banks received ﬁnancial and managerial assistance on a case-by-case
basis from the Ministry of Finance through the Bank of Thailand’s
Financial Institution Development Fund.35
Since 1997, Thailand has increased its prudential standards for banks
by, among other things, requiring increased provisions for nonperform-
ing loans, higher capital levels, and stricter loan classiﬁcations.36 In
addition, the government now requires banks to ﬁle more comprehensive
audits and to ﬁle them quarterly instead of annually.37
INDONESIA
Bankruptcy Law
Indonesia’s bankruptcy law, drafted by the Dutch in 1905, remained
unchanged in 1997. Remarkably, in the nearly 50 years since the Dutch
departed the archipelago, Indonesia had never translated its bankruptcy
law from Dutch into the native language.38 Declarations of bankruptcy
were extremely rare in Indonesia.39 As a consequence of the nonuse of the
bankruptcy law, judges and lawyers lacked experience in bankruptcy
matters.40 The courts are highly corrupt in Indonesia. Obtaining a
favorable verdict, much less enforcement of such verdict, usually neces-
sitates the use of money or political inﬂuence or both. Accordingly,
creditors and debtors preferred to settle their disputes outside the legal
system. The absence of qualiﬁed judges and professional bankruptcy
administrators (such as trustees in the United States) reinforced the
disposition of parties to refrain from utilizing the bankruptcy proce-
dures.41
In 1998, Indonesia established a special commercial court to handle
bankruptcies. In addition, the bankruptcy law was amended (in the
Indonesian language) to provide for the issuance and enforcement of
34 Thailand National Treatment Study, supra note 29, at 473-474.
35 Id. at 471.
36 Id. at 467; EIU Country Reports (Thailand), Finance & Banking (July 1, 1999).
37 EIU Country Reports (Thailand), Finance & Banking (June 1, 1998).
38 Tim Dodd, Indonesia Rewrites its Bankruptcy Laws, Australian Fin. Rev. (April 30,
1999).
39 According to one Indonesian law ﬁrm, as of 1997 almost no declarations of
bankruptcy had been pronounced by the courts in Jakarta during the previous 20 years.
Stacey Steele, The New Law on Bankruptcy in Indonesia, 23 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 144, 146
(1999).
40 Id. at 145-146.
41 Hafzan Taher and Ludo Mees, Does Indonesia Need New Bankruptcy Laws?, Jakarta
Post (March 5, 1998).
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of a bankruptcy petition.42 The new procedures permit a court to make a
declaration of bankruptcy with respect to a debtor that has two or more
creditors and defaults on at least one loan.43
Secured Transactions Law
In 1997, Indonesia had no modern secured transactions law. No
system existed in Indonesia for the registration of security interests, other
than real estate mortgages (known as hypotecs). Security interests were
permitted in personal property, but Indonesian law did not recognize
security interests in personal property that remained in the debtor’s
possession. And without a registration system, the utility of such security
interests was questionable. In the absence of a modern secured transac-
tions system, creditors frequently relied on personal guarantees.44
Indonesia has since enacted legislation, effective in September 1999,
that permits—through ﬁduciary transfers—security interests in personal
property that remains in the debtor’s possession. In a ﬁduciary transfer,
the debtor transfers title over speciﬁed goods to a creditor, but only in
trust. Once the debt is paid, title reverts to the original owner. Under the
legislation, a ﬁduciary transfer may be used to secure property other than
land, certain buildings, and large ships. Notably, the legislation also calls
for registries to be established in each of Indonesia’s provincial capitals.
While no registries have yet been established, it is expected that the ﬁrst
such registry will be set up soon in Jakarta. However, until a nationwide
(and effective) registration system is actually implemented, the utility of
security interests in Indonesia will remain questionable.45
Judicial System
In Indonesia, judges have been described as “‘auctioneers’ who hand
down verdicts to the highest bidder.”46 The Indonesian courts are not
42 Pay or Liquidate, The Jakarta Post, July 29, 1998.
43 EIU Country Reports (Indonesia), Economic Policy (June 8, 1998).
44 Indonesian law also permitted mortgages on aircraft, helicopters and ships of a
certain size. See Robert Brown and Alan Gutterman, Asian Economic and Legal Development
240-241 (1998). See also Richard Walsh, Paciﬁc Rim Collateral Security Laws: What Happens
When the Project Goes Wrong, 4 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 115, 134 (1999).
45 Robert Hornick, Fiduciary Transfer—Indonesia’s New Law on Collateral Security, Int’l
Fin. L. Rev. 29 (July 2000).
46 This is the view of Indonesia’s former State Enterprises Minister Laksamana Sukardi.
Warren Caragata, In Favor of Deadbeats, Asiaweek (March 31, 2000). Shortly after Minister
Sukardi made this statement, President Abdurrahman Wahid of Indonesia accused the
Minister of being involved in collusion, corruption, and nepotism and removed him from
ofﬁce.
40 John L. Walkerviewed as a viable forum for the resolution of commercial disputes. One
commentator has observed: “Indonesian law is so complex and diverse in
its sources that it is often impossible to know with certainty what rule
applies to a given situation.” Moreover, the law as written has “little to do
with what actually happens in a dispute, because the courts are so
corrupted and politically weak that they rarely oppose the policy of the
all-powerful executive and its bureaucracy.”47 This state of affairs is
exacerbated by the very low salaries paid to judges, the status of judges
as civil servants without tenure, and the lack of judicial experience in
commercial matters.48
Banking Regulation and Supervision
The unstable banking system that existed in 1997 was the direct
result of Indonesia’s failure—in the midst of deregulation—to adequately
supervise and impose prudential restrictions on the activities of Indone-
sian banks.49 In the late 1980s, the government undertook a major
deregulation of the state-controlled banking system in order to encourage
greater competition and to expand credit.50 Private sector banks could be
established. Increased foreign participation in the banking sector was also
permitted. Ten foreign banks, including Chase Manhattan Bank and
Citibank, operated branches in Jakarta prior to the government’s closure
of Indonesia to additional foreign bank activity in 1972. These ten banks
were permitted to open branches—offering a full range of banking
services—in seven additional major cities. In addition, foreign banks were
permitted to form joint ventures with domestic banks.51
The banking system expanded rapidly in response to the deregula-
tion measures. Private sector banks quickly gained in importance, al-
though by the end of 1995 the seven state-controlled banks still accounted
for about 35 percent of the total deposits and 40 percent of the total loans
of the commercial banks.52 However, largely unrestricted bank lending
practices and low minimum capitalization requirements left many of the
state-controlled and private sector banks with large portfolios of nonper-
forming loans and severely undercapitalized.53
Belatedly, Bank Indonesia, the Indonesian central bank, attempted to
47 Timothy C. Lindsey, Paradigms, Paradoxes and Possibilities: Towards Understandings of
Indonesia’s Legal System in Asian Laws Through Australian Eyes 90 (1997).
48 Dodd, supra note 38.
49 Michael S. Bennett, Banking Deregulation in Indonesia, 16 U. Pa. J. Int’l Bus. L. 443,
447-448 (1995).
50 Id. at 460.
51 Indonesia: Banking, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, National Treatment Study 286-288
(1998) [hereinafter “Indonesia National Treatment Study”].
52 EIU Country Proﬁles (Indonesia), Economic Infrastructure (Oct. 18, 1996).
53 Bennet, supra note 49, at 447-448.
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tightened reporting requirements, instituted more frequent on-site in-
spections, and raised the minimum capital adequacy ratio for commercial
banks to 8 percent. However, fearing that the stricter standards would
cause widespread bank failures, Bank Indonesia did not enforce the new
standards. In the wake of the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis, audits by international
accounting ﬁrms revealed that banks had routinely circumvented the
legal lending limits and underreported and inadequately provisioned for
unsound assets.54
In response to the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis, the government established
the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to supervise and
restructure the banking sector. In addition, among other things, the
government (i) raised the paid-in capital required to establish a new bank
(although existing banks were exempted), (ii) instituted bank legal
lending limits to control exposure to single groups of borrowers, (iii)
increased capital adequacy ratios,55 and (iv) prohibited banks from
investing in equity securities.56 In February 1998, the government re-




South Korea entered the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis equipped with a fairly
modern bankruptcy law. South Korea’s corporate reorganization law, for
instance, is based essentially on the Bankruptcy Code of the United States
as it existed prior to its revision in 1978. However, until the 1990s, the
bankruptcy law was of minimal importance in South Korea because the
government usually decided the fate of insolvent companies.58 The govern-
ment often forced banks to roll over loans instead of putting distressed
ﬁrms into bankruptcy.59 As the government began to lessen its dominant
role in the economy, the bankruptcy law gained in importance.60
The 1997 ﬁnancial crisis revealed that South Korea’s bankruptcy
system was far more effective in protecting—rather than doing away
with—inefﬁcient companies. Indeed, rather than suffering from nonuse,
54 Indonesia National Treatment Study, supra note 51, at 286.
55 EIU Country Reports (Indonesia), Finance & Banking (Dec. 4, 1998).
56 Indonesia National Treatment Study, supra note 51, at 285-286.
57 EIU Country Finance, Foreign Banks 1.4 (July 31, 1999).
58 Mikyung Yun, A Primer on Korean Bankruptcy Law, 1999 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 2.
59 EIU Financing Operations (South Korea), Domestic Commercial Banks 5.2 (March 1,
1997).
60 Yun, supra note 58, at 2.
42 John L. Walkerthe bankruptcy system was used too much during the 1990s. The
weakness of the bankruptcy system stemmed largely from factors outside
the system. South Korea is dominated by large companies, including the
huge family-owned conglomerates known as “chaebol,” which control 50
percent of the South Korean GDP. A single bankruptcy carries the
potential for widespread unemployment in South Korea. Consequently,
the government, labor interests, and the South Korean society as a whole
were loath to permit such bankruptcies to occur. The prejudice against
bankruptcy was reinforced by a business culture that viewed “big
liquidations as a national embarrassment.”61 Perhaps most important, the
South Korean banks, the main creditors of the conglomerates, were
reluctant to force the conglomerates into bankruptcy. Such a course
would have required the banks to write off huge amounts of debt.62
Because several decades of policy lending had already left the banking
system in a precarious state, the banks sought to mask the extent of their
plight by keeping such debt on their books at face value.63
These factors, when combined with a South Korean bankruptcy
provision known as “Hwaeui,” resulted in abuse of the bankruptcy
system. Under Hwaeui, a debtor received court protection in order to
reschedule its debt. As practiced in South Korea, however, Hwaeui
usually resulted in the indeﬁnite postponement of debt payments.
Hwaeui enabled an insolvent ﬁrm to defer its existing debts and interest
payments and to take out new loans. The original management remained
in day-to-day control of the ﬁrm and the shareholders’ rights and
interests remained intact. In addition, a court could not close any
company shielded by Hwaeui for 10 years without the agreement of
two-thirds of the company’s creditors. This usually meant continued
“survival” for the company since the creditors, often numbering in the
dozens, having their own priorities, could rarely reach agreement. A
company, however, could choose Hwaeui only with the acquiescence of
its creditors. Creditors typically acquiesced because they preferred
Hwaeui to liquidation or restructuring, which would have required them
to write down or write off the insolvent company’s debt. Hwaeui allowed
the banks to keep such debt on their books at face value indeﬁnitely.64
South Korea tightened its debt rescheduling laws in 1998. The 1998
reforms provided, among other things, (i) guidelines to judges recom-
mending that debt rescheduling not be allowed for ﬁrms with total bank
loans of more than 250 billion won and (ii) that debt rescheduling will
61 Michael Schuman, “Never-Never Land”: Korea’s System Won’t Let Biggest Bankrupt
Firms Die, Asian Wall Street Journal (March 10, 1998).
62 South Korean Bankruptcy: Death, Where Is Thy Sting?, The Economist (July 17, 1999).
63 Id.; EIU Country Proﬁles (South Korea), Economic Infrastructure (Oct. 18, 1996).
64 The Economist, supra note 62.
BUILDING THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 43be denied if insolvency resulted from misappropriation of funds by
managers.65
Secured Transactions Law
South Korea’s secured transactions law permits the taking of security
interests in real estate, intangible rights (such as intellectual property),
inventory, accounts receivable, and, by special acts, aircraft, ships, heavy
equipment, and vehicles. Security interests can be taken in property that
is in the debtor’s possession. Despite the wide variety of permitted
security interests, most secured transactions have been collateralized by
real estate.66
Enforcement of security interests has been effective in South Korea,
although it can take up to one year for a creditor to recover collateral.
Excepting “extraordinary situations,” the government has respected the
rights of secured creditors.67 Despite the regime’s relative effectiveness
and apparent sophistication, the Asian Development Bank has concluded
that security interests were not important in managing risk because much
of South Korea’s bank lending consisted of policy loans implicitly
guaranteed by the government, which obviated the need for collateral.68
Judicial System
The judiciary in South Korea is considered to be of “generally good
quality.” “Contractual agreements are secure,” with South Korea’s “com-
mercial codes and legal framework comparable to those in developed
countries.”69 In 1997, however, observers still discerned corruption and
other irregularities in the lower-rank ofﬁcialdom despite occasional
crackdowns.70
65 Yun, supra note 58, at 5.
66 Katharina Pistor and Philip A. Wellons, The Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Asian
Economic Development 177, 179 (1998).
67 In the 1980s, the South Korean government, as part of a restructuring program,
prevented creditors from enforcing security interests relating to the shipbuilding, overseas
construction, textile, and lumber industries. Id. at 178.
68 Id. at 179.
69 EIU Investing Licensing & Trading (South Korea), Political Conditions 1.1 (July 1,
1997).
70 Id. South Korea acted quickly to strengthen its judiciary. In a 1998 report, the EIU
noted that corruption in the lower ranks had been dealt with through repeated crackdowns.
EIU Investing Licensing & Trading (South Korea), Political Conditions 1.1 (July 29, 1998). And
in 1999, investor Mark Mobius cited South Korea and Hong Kong as being the most
favorable places to invest in Asia due to their established legal systems (and clearer reports
to shareholders). Mobius Raising $500 Million Private Equity Fund for Investment in Asia,
Business Day (Thailand) (Aug. 16, 1999).
44 John L. WalkerBanking Regulation and Supervision
In 1997, nonperforming loans permeated South Korea’s banking
system. The weak state of the banking system was the result of several
decades of policy lending, whereby both state-controlled and private
sector banks lent to those industries most favored by the government. As
the South Korean economy slowed, these industries, such as shipbuild-
ing, steel, and electronics, could no longer service their debts. South
Korean regulators chose to ignore the problem. In 1996, for instance, the
amount that banks had to set aside to cover losses was reduced.71
In the 1990s, the government took steps to deregulate the banking
sector.72 As part of its liberalization efforts, the government ceased
appointing the presidents of the commercial banks, permitted banks to
open more branches, lowered reserve requirements, and eased lending
guidelines. Nonetheless, many restrictions on the banking sector re-
mained. Despite the removal of most restrictions on interest rates, the
interest rates on demand deposits and policy loans continued to be
regulated. Other restrictions were maintained in order to moderate the
inﬂuence of the chaebol. The government prohibited chaebol from
controlling any commercial bank or from owning more than 4 percent of
the seven largest commercial banks. In addition, the government sought
to limit the amount of bank lending to chaebol by requiring national
banks, provincial banks, and foreign banks to extend 45 percent, 70
percent, and 25 percent, respectively, of their new loans to small and
medium-sized companies.73 The banks also remained subject to informal
government requirements concerning credit allocation, liquidity control,
and support for various economic and social policy objectives.74
Foreign banks also operated in a highly regulated atmosphere.
Foreign banks could not establish subsidiaries.75 Lending by foreign bank
branches was restricted because the government used a foreign bank’s
local capital in calculating prudential lending limits instead of the
worldwide capital of the bank. In addition, foreign banks were subject to
a host of other complex rules and regulations.76 As a result of continued
government interference in the commercial banking sector, nonbank
ﬁnancial institutions controlled nearly 75 percent of total loans by late
71 EIU ViewsWire (South Korea), Asia Finance: Fall from Grace (April 14, 1997).
72 Korea: Banking, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, National Treatment Study 364 (1994)
[hereinafter “1994 Korea National Treatment Study”].
73 EIU Financing Foreign Operations (South Korea), Banks and Other Financial Institu-
tions 5.0 (March 1, 1997).
74 1994 Korea National Treatment Study, supra note 72, at 369.
75 Wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign banks have been permitted since March 1998.
Korea: Banking, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, National Treatment Study 323 (1998) [herein-
after “1998 Korea National Treatment Study”].
76 1994 Korea National Treatment Study, supra note 72, at 367, 369-371.
BUILDING THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 451996. These nonbank ﬁnancial institutions enjoyed greater freedom to
manage their assets and liabilities, including charging higher rates on
loans.77
In the wake of the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis, South Korea strengthened its
prudential regulations by implementing a new asset-quality assessment
framework, tighter limitations on loans to single borrowers, a prompt
corrective action framework, and improved accounting policies. In addi-
tion, regulation of the entire ﬁnancial system was placed under a newly
established Financial Supervisory Commission.78 Further, the govern-
ment relaxed foreign exchange regulations, removed restrictions on
foreign capital inﬂows, and permitted foreign banks to participate in
mergers and acquisitions of domestic ﬁnancial institutions.79
TAIWAN
Bankruptcy Law
Taiwan’s bankruptcy system has been highly effective over the years.
In 1996, for example, approximately 25,000 companies went out of
business, about 4.7 percent of the total businesses in Taiwan.80 The
regime’s effectiveness is explained, at least in part, by the fact that
Taiwan’s economy consists mainly of small ﬁrms. Bankruptcies of small
ﬁrms can take place without resulting in large-scale unemployment.
Thus, it was politically acceptable in Taiwan for insolvent enterprises to
be restructured or dissolved.
Secured Transactions Law
Taiwan’s secured transaction law is effective and sophisticated, and
it utilizes a reliable registration system.81 The secured transactions law
permits the taking of security in personal property that remains in the
debtor’s possession. However, the law—which borrows heavily from U.S.
laws in effect prior to the Uniform Commercial Code—does not recognize
the use of inventory and accounts receivable as collateral. In 1995, 65
percent of all loans extended by banks in Taiwan were secured.82
77 EIU Financing Foreign Operations (South Korea), Banks and Financial Institutions 5.0
(March 1, 1997).
78 86 Fed. Res. Bull. 4 (April 2000).
79 1998 Korea National Treatment Study, supra note 75, at 323.
80 Editorial, Going for Broke: Korea Steels Itself for Failure, Far Eastern Economic Review
(June 11, 1998).
81 1998 Investment Climate Report for Taiwan, Int’l Mkt. Insight 1, 13 (July 2, 1998).
82 Pistor and Wellons, supra note 66, at 172-175.
46 John L. WalkerJudicial System
Taiwan has a comprehensive legal system that protects property
rights and foreign investments, and ensures fair competition.83 The courts
enforce judgments of foreign courts.84
Observers, however, have differed in their assessments of Taiwan’s
judiciary. The U.S. State Department considers the courts to be indepen-
dent and free from interference by the executive branch.85 In contrast, the
EIU has pointed to the reputation of the judiciary for corruption and
cronyism.86 It believed that this reputation remained warranted in late
1996 despite recent improvements that had resulted in the local judiciary
becoming “moderately independent and trying hard to allay concerns
about corruption.”87
By 1997, Taiwan’s economic development had led to considerable
demand for legal expertise as a result of (i) the legally complex invest-
ment projects that accompanied such economic development and (ii) the
wave of legislative reforms that followed the end of martial law in 1987.
A partner in one of Taiwan’s largest law ﬁrms stated: “When the
economy is good, we have more investment cases; when the economy is
bad, we have more litigation cases.”88
Banking Regulation and Supervision
In 1997, Taiwan’s state-controlled and private sector banks operated
in a liberalized banking environment marked by strict prudential require-
ments and oversight. Interest rates were not restricted. Although Tai-
wan’s banking system had been opened to private sector banks in 1988,
state-controlled banks continued to dominate the sector. At the end of
1997, 13 state-controlled banks held more than 60 percent of the assets
and deposits of all deposit-taking institutions. No law or regulation,
however, granted state-controlled banks preferential treatment.89 Foreign
banks could establish an unlimited number of branches anywhere in the
country, and such branches were allowed to engage in wide-ranging
activities.90
In tandem with a liberalized banking environment, Taiwan subjected
83 1998 Investment Climate Report for Taiwan, supra note 81, at 13.
84 Id. at 14.
85 Id.
86 EIU Investing Licensing & Trading (Taiwan), Political Assessment 1.1 (Dec. 19, 1997).
87 EIU Investing Licensing & Trading (Taiwan), Political Assessment 1.1 (Dec. 1, 1996).
88 Matt Born, Keeping Pace with the Tiger, Asia Law (April 1997).
89 Taiwan: Banking, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, National Treatment Study 450-454
(1998) [hereinafter “Taiwan National Treatment Study”].
90 EIU Financing Foreign Operations (Taiwan), Foreign Commercial Banks 5.3 (Nov. 1,
1996).
BUILDING THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 47banks to strict prudential requirements. For example, (i) ownership could
not exceed 5 percent for each shareholder or 15 percent per shareholder
plus relatives and corporate entities under their control, (ii) banks could
not offer unsecured loans to bank executives or to shareholders with more
than 3 percent ownership, and (iii) banks had to meet the BIS capital
adequacy requirement that capital exceed 8 percent of risk-weighted
assets.91 Financial institutions were subject to regular and unannounced
examinations. A voluntary deposit insurance system covered 83 percent
of domestic banks and 64 percent of foreign banks. The system guaran-




China’s bankruptcy law applies only to state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). Bankruptcy of individuals and private companies is not recog-
nized.93 The bankruptcy regime is not particularly effective. As of 1995,
only slightly more than 2,000 SOEs had ﬁled for bankruptcy94 despite the
fact that a vast number of them were insolvent.95
China’s bankruptcy law lacks effectiveness for several reasons. First,
insolvent SOEs may submit to bankruptcy only with the permission of
the relevant government department.96 Bankruptcy, therefore, is a ques-
tion not only of economics, but of politics as well. The government makes
the ﬁnal determination as to whether an enterprise may enter into a
bankruptcy proceeding. Because the government fears the consequences
of widespread unemployment, it is reluctant to permit bankruptcies of
SOEs. This reluctance has been heightened by the fact that workers of
bankrupt SOEs are threatened not only with the loss of their jobs, but of
their entire social security framework. Most SOEs provide China’s work
force with their housing, pensions, medical care, and schooling. China
has established only the rudiments of a social security system with which
91 Taiwan National Treatment Study, supra note 89, at 452. However, the EIU asserted
in 1995 that “[i]ntense competition for business often leads many banks, including foreign
banks, to ignore standard international market practices and BIS guidelines.” EIU Financing
Foreign Operations (Taiwan), Financial Conditions 1.3 (Dec. 1, 1995).
92 Taiwan National Treatment Study, supra note 89, at 454.
93 Ronald Winston Harmer, Insolvency Law and Reform in the People’s Republic of China,
64 Fordham L. Rev. 2563, 2574 (1996). The law has also been applied in practice by courts
to some collectively owned enterprises. Jerome A. Cohen and John E. Lange, The Chinese
Legal System: A Primer for Investors, 17 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 345, 371 (1997).
94 Steven L. Seebach, Bankruptcy Behind the Great Wall, 8 Transnat’l Law. 351, 368 (1995).
95 EIU ViewsWire (China), China Investment: EIU Survey Debunks Market Potential Myths
(Nov. 9, 1995).
96 Cohen and Lange, supra note 93, at 371.
48 John L. Walkerto replace that provided by the SOEs.97 Second, the bankruptcy law’s
heavy emphasis on liquidation—as opposed to reorganization—can only
have increased the government’s reluctance to use the law.98 Third, a
local court must also consent to the bankruptcy of an SOE. Here, too,
politics plays a major role because of the susceptibility of the courts to
local political inﬂuence.99 The local courts are loath to put local industries
out of business. Fourth, the large state-owned banks, which are the major
creditors of the SOEs, also have opposed SOE bankruptcies. The banks
were not willing to write off the huge amount of debt owed to them by
insolvent SOEs.100
Secured Transactions Law
China’s secured transactions system exists—for the most part—only
on paper.101 Pursuant to the Security Law, enacted in 1995, China
recognizes mortgages, pledges, and liens.102 It is unclear under the law
whether security interests in bank accounts or ﬂoating charges on
inventory are also permitted.103 Prior to the Security Law, secured
transaction regulations existed only in several economically progressive
provinces, special economic zones, and cities.104
The Security Law, however, failed to create a viable secured trans-
actions system in China. Neither the Security Law nor local regulations
generally contain provisions for the registration and enforcement of
security interests in personal property.105
With respect to real property, while the Security Law, like many local
regulations, provides for the registration and foreclosure of mortgages in
land, enforcement has been largely ineffective.106 The local courts have
been generally unwilling to permit foreclosure against local debtors.107
And even where creditors have obtained an order of foreclosure from
the courts, such orders generally have been enforced only with great
difﬁculty.108
97 EIU China Hand, Economy (Jan. 1, 1999).
98 Harmer, supra note 93, at 2575.
99 Cohen and Lange, supra note 96, at 371.
100 Harmer, supra note 93, at 2579.
101 Cohen and Lange, supra note 96, at 370-371.
102 Guarantees and deposits are also permitted. A deposit is a 20 percent maximum
transfer of cash to secure performance of an obligation. Kevin T.S. Kong, Prospects for Asset
Securitization Within China’s Legal Framework: The Two-Tiered Model, 32 Cornell Int’l L.J. 237,
254 (1998).
103 EIU China Hand, Finance (Feb. 1, 1999).
104 Todd R. Benson, Taking Security in China, 21 Yale J. Int’l L. 183, 197 (1996).
105 Cohen and Lange, supra note 96, at 370-371.
106 Id. This was still the case in 1999. EIU China Hand, Finance (Feb. 1, 1999).
107 Benson, supra note 104, at 216; Cohen and Lange, supra note 96, at 371.
108 Benson, supra note 104, at 215, 227 n.204.
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No independent judiciary exists in China. The judiciary is a func-
tional arm of the political bureaucracy and subject to heavy inﬂuence
from the Communist Party. Every court has a committee of senior judges,
including party members, that can reverse verdicts. In addition, the
courts are subject to local political inﬂuence. As a result, the courts not
only make decisions based on political factors, but engage in localism
whereby the local party is favored over litigants from outside the region.
Judgments from other parts of the country are difﬁcult to enforce.109
Those with the most political or economic inﬂuence have the best
“guanxi,” or personal connections, as well. Guanxi, rather than the rule of
law, determines the outcome of many Chinese court proceedings. It has
been observed that victory goes to the side with the most powerful people
supporting it and not to the side with the most compelling legal
argument.110
In addition, the laws themselves lack transparency. Rules are subject
to repeal without notice, and many internal regulations (directives given
by the government to its ofﬁcials) are not easily accessible to the public.111
The legal system also lacks adequate numbers of judges and lawyers
experienced in commercial law.112 China has had a modern commercial
law only since the ascendency of Deng Xiaoping in 1978. It has been
observed that this has been much too short a “period of time to develop
the web of rules, customs, practices, institutions, habits, and attitudes that
make up a legal system.”113
It is noteworthy, however, that in 1995 at least one commentator had
already discerned increasing independence in the Chinese judiciary and
argued that politically mandated reversals of court decisions were
becoming rare. The Chinese leadership, most of whom know ﬁrsthand
the consequences of lawlessness from the decade-long nightmare of the
Cultural Revolution, want to see an independent judiciary develop.114
Banking Regulation and Supervision
While no modern commercial banking system existed in China in
1997, the Chinese government had taken steps in that direction. In 1994,
the government converted four “specialized” state-owned banks (the
“Big Four”) that had dominated the domestic banking system into
109 Kong, supra note 102, at 249-250.
110 Benson, supra note 104, at 217-218.
111 Id. at 191.
112 Kong, supra note 102, at 264.
113 Cohen and Lange, supra note 96, at 348.
114 Marcus W. Brauchli, Beijing Eases Up: China’s Economic Changes Spur Legal-System
Reform, Wall St. J. (June 21, 1995).
50 John L. Walker“commercial” banks by assigning their duties for making so-called
“policy loans” to three newly established “policy” banks.115 The policy
banks do not accept deposits. As part of their conversion, the Big Four
banks were given a measure of autonomy in making decisions to extend
credit.116 And in 1995, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) received legal
authority to function as China’s central bank.117 Also, the system was
opened to private sector banks.
Despite such reforms, however, the system remained under heavy
government control. All interest rates on deposits and loans were set by
the PBOC.118 Government regulations impeded the development of new
products.119 Moreover, the banking system remained inextricably linked
to the SOEs. The SOEs continued to receive an overwhelming percentage
of the loans extended by banks.120 And the government controlled overall
bank lending through a credit plan.121 Favored sectors of the economy
were given preferential lending rates in the form of policy loans. The Big
Four state-owned banks continued to dominate the banking sector, with
about 70 percent of the banking system’s assets as of year-end 1997.122
The Big Four banks—despite their conversion into commercial banks—
continued to participate in directed lending to SOEs and national
projects, and they purchased bonds issued by the policy banks.123
Aggregate lending volume had to comply with the government’s devel-
opment policies,124 and a large percentage of their policy loans were not
transferred to the policy banks.125 In addition, ofﬁcial policies discour-
aged state-owned banks from providing private sector enterprises with
credit in proportion to their increasing weight in the economy.126 Lending
115 China: Banking, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, National Treatment Study (1998)
[hereinafter “China National Treatment Study”]; John L. Walker, Financial Reform in China,
presentation at 2000 Harvard Asia Business Conference, Harvard Business School (Jan. 28,
2000) (on ﬁle with author).
116 Moody’s Investors Service, Banking System Outlook (China) 13 (1999) [hereinafter
“Moody’s”].
117 Id. at 14.
118 China National Treatment Study, supra note 115, at 181.
119 Moody’s, supra note 116, at 10.
120 At year-end 1998, for instance, about 90 percent of all bank loans were made to SOEs
according to the PBOC. Moody’s, supra note 116, at 11.
121 The credit plan was eliminated in January 1998. China National Treatment Study,
supra note 115, at 177.
122 Id. at 178.
123 Moody’s, supra note 116, at 13.
124 Id.
125 China National Treatment Study, supra note 115, at 179.
126 Id. at 178.
BUILDING THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 51decisions of state-owned banks remained subject to the heavy inﬂuence of
provincial governments.127
Foreign banking activities were highly restricted. Among other
things, foreign banks were limited in where they could be located128 and
prevented from conducting business in local currency (except in the
Pudong district of Shanghai).129 A foreign bank could not accept deposits
from a Chinese enterprise unless the enterprise had received a loan from
the bank. In addition, foreign banks could not make foreign currency
loans to Chinese enterprises without the approval of both the PBOC and
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange.
Despite supervisory guidelines requiring all banks to achieve inter-
national capital standards,130 prudential regulation remained lax. Inter-
national standards were not used in the classiﬁcation of nonperforming
loans—only the overdue portion of a loan, rather than the entire loan,
was classiﬁed as nonperforming. Also, no regulation required depositors
to put their real names on their bank accounts. Anyone could open a
savings account under any name, without any identiﬁcation being
required. This aided individuals in concealing money obtained through
bribery, corruption, or the taking of assets from SOEs.131
Since 1997, China has undertaken further reforms of the banking
sector. In 1998, the provincial branches of the PBOC were reorganized
from 31 into nine regional centers, modeled somewhat after the Federal
Reserve System in the United States, to enhance the PBOC’s regulatory
authority and to counter interference from the provincial governments.132
Also, the government injected the equivalent of roughly $33 billion of
new capital into the Big Four banks, closed several particularly weak
ﬁnancial institutions, and established government-owned asset manage-
ment companies to handle nonperforming loans made by the banks prior
to 1996.133
127 Moody’s, supra note 116, at 14. Prior to 1997, the management of a Chinese bank’s
branch reported in a dual manner both to the bank’s head ofﬁce and to the provincial
government. Since 1997, branch management reports only to the bank’s head ofﬁce. Id.
128 At year-end 1997, foreign banks could operate only in 23 cities and in Hainan
Province. China: Overseas Financial Business Encouraged, Beijing Review (Nov. 24, 1997).
129 By year-end 1997, nine foreign banks, including Citibank, had received approval to
engage in renminbi business in Pudong. Loans denominated in renminbi, however, may not
exceed 35 percent of a bank’s total renminbi deposits. China National Treatment Study,
supra note 115, at 183.
130 China National Treatment Study, supra note 115, at 184.
131 Erik Eckholm, China to End Bank Secrecy in Effort Against Corruption, N.Y. Times (Jan.
21, 2000). The PBOC has recently announced a “real-name system” for bank deposits. Id.
132 Moody’s, supra note 116, at 14.
133 Id. at 13, 14, 18.
52 John L. WalkerRUSSIA
Bankruptcy Law
When the August 1998 ﬁnancial crisis arrived, Russia’s bankruptcy
law—its second since 1993—had been in place for less than six months.134
The law was considered one of Eastern Europe’s strictest.135 Unlike its
predecessor, the new law applied to nearly all corporate forms and
covered for the ﬁrst time personal bankruptcies as well. Under the law, an
entity qualiﬁes for bankruptcy if it is unable to pay its debts, including tax
obligations to the government, for a period of three months. This is a
much stricter and more effective deﬁnition than that of the previous law,
under which bankruptcy occurred when an entity’s liabilities exceeded its
assets. This balance sheet deﬁnition allowed many insolvent ﬁrms to
escape bankruptcy as a result of the difﬁculty of determining the value of
assets in Russia, as well as the use of Soviet accounting methods.136 Also,
the new law requires an insolvent company’s executive body to apply for
a declaration of insolvency within one month of the emergence of the
insolvent condition. If the executive body fails to do so, its members face
potential personal liability for all obligations arising after an application
should have been ﬁled.137
The new law’s restructuring provisions permit companies to con-
tinue operations while enjoying some protection from creditors. But
unlike the previous law—under which cases could linger in court for
years—the 1998 law requires the debtor, its creditors, and the court to act
within a deﬁnite time frame.138 The law provides for an observation
period of three to ﬁve months prior to a formal declaration of bankruptcy.
During this period, the court appoints an interim manager, convenes a
creditors’ meeting, and assesses the ﬁnancial status of the debtor. The
management of the debtor remains in control unless removed by the
court for cause, such as hindering the interim manager. If bankruptcy is
approved, the entire management has to be dismissed and replaced with
external managers selected by the creditors. External management can
last for no more than one and one-half years. If such management fails, or
if the enterprise is deemed unsuitable for reorganization, the court can
order liquidation.139
134 The law took effect on March 1, 1998. Robert Wood and Brian Zimbler, Russia: New
Bankruptcy Law, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. (1998).
135 EIU ViewsWire (Russia), Russia Finance: Bankruptcy Petitions Soar (April 26, 1999).
136 Geoffrey York, Russia Launches Bankruptcy Reform, The Globe and Mail (March 6,
1998).
137 Britt Shaw, New Law Resolves Issues of Bankruptcy, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. (1998).
138 Id.
139 Craig A. Hart, Undoing Privatization? Russian Bankruptcy Law and Privatization,1 4
Bankr. Dev. J. 311, 314-318 (1998).
BUILDING THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 53The law, however, contains ﬂaws. First, it generally exempts from its
coverage “town-forming enterprises”—companies with more than 5,000
employees or whose employees and family members constitute one-half
or more of a town’s population. Such enterprises can be externally
managed for up to 10 years, but cannot be liquidated.140 Therefore, the
largest and most inefﬁcient companies in Russia are relatively untouched
by the law. Second, the law requires preliminary hearings to be held in
the debtor’s home city. This creates the potential for court bias in favor of
local debtors.141 Other ﬂaws, however, are systemic and not the fault of
the bankruptcy law. For example, although the law introduced the
position of court-appointed receivers, the number of properly trained
receivers remains insufﬁcient to handle bankruptcies.142 Also, the gov-
ernment itself often is opposed to the bankruptcy of an enterprise because
the large Russian enterprises provide housing, schools, clinics, and other
social services to employees. One commentator has stated that “[w]hen
an entire country is insolvent implementing a bankruptcy law is a
delicate business.”143
Secured Transactions Law
Russia’s secured transactions law, based on the 1992 Law of Pledge
and the 1995 Civil Code, recognizes a broad range of security interests.
Collateral, for instance, can be taken in inventory and after-acquired
property, and the law permits debtors to remain in possession of secured
property.144 However, no registration system exists for personal property.
Personal property is automatically perfected against subsequent creditors
upon execution of a valid security agreement. In lieu of a ﬁling system,
the law obligates the debtor to inform each subsequent secured creditor
about existing security interests in the relevant collateral.145 Failure to
make such disclosure results in liability of the debtor for any loss suffered
by the creditor. This approach requires creditors to depend almost solely
on the assurance of the debtor. Creditors are not likely to be impressed by
such recourse to the debtor, since the purpose of a secured transactions
law is to enable the creditor to recover on the property without having to
pursue the debtor.
The law does provide for a uniﬁed registration system for real
140 Russia’s New Bankruptcy Law Workable But Flawed, 26 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 7 (1998).
141 EIU ViewsWire (Russia), supra note 135.
142 Moreover, these receivers were observed in 1999 to be “notorious [for] fraud or
collusion with debtors.” Id.
143 Id.
144 Jason J. Kilborn, Securing Russia’s Future: A Plea for Reform in Russian Secured
Transactions Law, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 255, 259-260 (1996).
145 Brandon Bennett, Secured Financing in Russia: Risks, Legal Incentives, and Policy
Concerns, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 1443, 1452, 1455-1456 (1999).
54 John L. Walkerproperty, but it was not until February 1998 that Russia passed legislation
establishing a national registry.146 The effectiveness of this registration
system remains to be seen.
Judicial System
Russians and non-Russians alike have a low opinion of Russia’s legal
system. One Western mutual fund manager complained in 1995: “Don’t
even think about getting justice in a Russian court.”147 Russians view the
courts, along with other state institutions, with broad distrust and
disrespect. During the Soviet era the courts engaged in “telephone
justice,” making rulings based on the telephone instructions of Commu-
nist ofﬁcials.148 In the post-Soviet era, judges became susceptible to bribery
and coercion. It did not escape public notice that in court the more powerful
and inﬂuential party tended to prevail regardless of legal merit.149
Low salaries have left judges open to bribery. While judges are
among the highest-paid ofﬁcials in the Russian government—receiving
the equivalent of roughly $550 a month in 1997—their compensation is
meager compared to that of workers in the private sector.150 And with the
exception of the Russian Supreme Court, the courts lack independent
budgets.151 As a result, judges in the regional and local courts, in
particular, are subjected to political pressure by local political ofﬁcials
who control their salaries and access to housing.152 In addition, judges
have been subjected to physical coercion by organized crime groups.153
Most commercial litigation is handled by commercial courts, known
as arbitrazh courts.154 Unfortunately, most arbitrazh judges are holdovers
from the Soviet era and lack training in the legal principles of a
market-oriented system. Observers have also complained that arbitrazh
judges routinely issue inaccurate and carelessly drafted opinions.155
Since 1997, Russia has permitted the enforcement of foreign arbitra-
tion awards, even if no reciprocal treaty exists between Russia and the
146 Id. at 1456-1458.
147 Glenn P. Hendrix, Business Litigation and Arbitration in Russia, 31 Int’l Law. 1075
(1998).
148 Id.
149 Karen Halverson, Resolving Economic Disputes in Russia’s Market Economy, 18 Mich.
J. Int’l L. 59, 101-102 (1997).
150 Hendrix, supra note 147, at 1090.
151 Scott P. Boylan, The Status of Judicial Reform in Russia, 13 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1327,
1334 (1998).
152 1998 Investment Climate Statement for Russia, Int’l Mkt. Insight (July 10, 1998);
Halverson, supra note 149, at 102.
153 Halverson, supra note 149, at 102.
154 Hendrix, supra note 147, at 1086.
155 Halverson, supra note 149, at 104.
BUILDING THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 55country in which the order was issued.156 But enforcement of court
decisions, including foreign arbitration awards, remains a major problem
in Russia.157 According to the Ministry of Justice, in 1995 only 50 percent
of court rulings involving the recovery of money were implemented. To
remedy this, Russia created a marshals service, which became operational
in 1998. The marshals were vested with broad powers to compel
compliance with court rulings.158 However, as of 1998, the service was not
fully staffed and had yet to prove its effectiveness.159
Banking Regulation and Supervision
In 1998, the diverse and fast-growing activities of Russia’s banks
were not sufﬁciently regulated or supervised. Use of international ac-
counting standards was infrequent and the banks were undercapital-
ized.160 The assets on the balance sheets of Russian banks consisted
predominantly of Russian government securities, and the banks had
extensive off-balance-sheet foreign exchange exposure.
In the late 1980s, Russia decentralized its ﬁnancial sector and
permitted the establishment of private banks. The Central Bank of Russia
(CBR) was created and the state bank of the Soviet Union, Gosbank, was
dismantled.161 The reforms led to an explosion of private sector banks in
Russia. The number of licensed banks reached a high of approximately
2,500 in 1995 and then declined to approximately 1,600 by July 1998.
Despite the large number of banks, banking activity was concentrated in
the 200 largest banks. Many of these large banks were linked together
with industrial ﬁrms, forming ﬁnancial–industrial groups. Other banks,
so-called “pocket” banks, were entirely controlled by and dedicated to
serving a single enterprise. Despite the rapid expansion of private sector
banks, Sberbank, the state-owned savings bank, remained the largest
bank and dominated the market, accounting for more than one-fourth of
all banking assets. Because no deposit insurance system existed in Russia,
the vast majority of retail deposits were held by Sberbank owing to the
implied government guarantee of its deposits, as well as its extensive
national branch and agency network.162
Banks were allowed to engage in widespread activities including
156 1998 Investment Climate Statement for Russia, supra note 152.
157 The general courts, not the arbitrazh courts, are responsible for enforcement of
foreign arbitration awards. Hendrix, supra note 147, at 1086.
158 Hendrix, supra note 147, at 1099.
159 1998 Investment Climate Statement for Russia, supra note 152; Hendrix, supra note 147,
at 1099.
160 Russia: Banking, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, National Treatment Study 394 (1998)
[hereinafter “Russia National Treatment Study”].
161 EIU Country Proﬁles (Russia), Economic Infrastructure (June 24, 1997).
162 Russia National Treatment Study, supra note 160, at 394, 395.
56 John L. Walkermaking investments in securities, interbank lending, foreign exchange,
futures operations, export ﬁnancing, custody services, the issuance of
debt instruments, and investment banking activities. Foreign banks were
generally free to engage in any banking activities. However, policy
decisions of the CBR permit foreign banks to operate only through
subsidiaries instead of branches and impose higher capital requirements
on foreign banks. Since 1996, foreign banks have been permitted to
establish full-service subsidiaries that provide retail and commercial
banking services to Russian clients. Seventy-ﬁve percent of the employees
of such a subsidiary must be Russian citizens and 50 percent of its
management board must be Russian citizens. Further, foreign banks may
not own more than 12 percent of the total paid-in capital of all banks in
Russia. Permission of the CBR is required for nonresidents to own more
than 1 percent of the shares of a domestic bank.163
In response to the expansion of private sector banks in Russia, in July
1995 the CBR was given stronger supervisory powers. These new powers
included the ability to revoke the licenses of banks that reported incorrect
data, performed operations for which they had not been licensed, and
evidenced an unsatisfactory ﬁnancial position. However, the CBR could
not shut down the operations of unlicensed banks. Thus, even though by
July 1998 the CBR had revoked 927 licenses, only 439 of those institutions
had been liquidated.164 Intense liquidity problems led to rapid consoli-
dation in the banking industry after August 1998.165
The CBR also strengthened its supervision and regulation of the
banking sector by the following actions: (i) forming a special unit,
OPERU-2, to oversee the activities of the 14 largest institutions; (ii)
gradually raising capital adequacy ratios; (iii) moving toward the estab-
lishment of international accounting standards through the introduction
of a new Chart of Accounts early in 1998; (iv) tightening licensing
procedures; (v) requiring banks to establish internal controls; and (vi)
adopting provisioning requirements for nonperforming loans.166
In response to the events of August 1998, the CBR raised minimum
capital adequacy ratios for banks effective January 2001. Reporting
standards were strengthened as well.167 In order to restructure the
banking sector, the government created the Agency for Restructuring
Lending Institutions (ARCO).168
163 Id. at 393, 398-399.
164 Id. at 395. The CBR’s power to close banks was strengthened in the wake of the
ﬁnancial crisis with the passage in 1999 of bank insolvency legislation. EIU Country Finance,
Domestic Banks 1.3 (April 30, 2000).
165 Russia National Treatment Study, supra note 160, at 395.
166 Id. at 397.
167 Id.
168 EIU Country Finance, Bank Regulators 1.2 (April 30, 2000).
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As stated above, poorly developed legal and regulatory frameworks
were not the proximate cause of the ﬁnancial crises in East Asia and
Russia. But once the crises began, weak legal and regulatory frameworks
made it impossible to contain the problem and to work to restore ﬁnancial
stability and conﬁdence. The magnitude of the crises was ampliﬁed as a
result. And it is entirely possible that in a well-regulated and well-
supervised ﬁnancial system, the systemic mismatching of maturities and
the foreign currency and market risks that occurred in East Asian
countries might have been avoided.
In comparing the legal and regulatory frameworks of Thailand,
Indonesia, and South Korea, it appears that Indonesia has the weakest
legal and regulatory framework of the three countries and that South
Korea has the strongest. This ranking mirrors the depth of the ﬁnancial
crisis, and the level of recovery from the crisis, in these three countries.
While each of the three countries is currently experiencing positive
growth rates, Indonesia’s economy was the most affected by the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis and has recovered the least. This is reﬂected in the current
long-term bond ratings by Moody’s Investors Service for the three
countries: South Korea, Baa2; Thailand, Ba1 (under review for possible
upgrade); and Indonesia, B3. Similarly, the ratings of long-term bank
deposits by Moody’s are as follows: South Korea, Baa3; Thailand, B1
(under review for possible upgrade); and Indonesia, Caa1. By compari-
son, Taiwan, which has the most developed legal and regulatory frame-
work in East Asia, suffered the least from the Asian ﬁnancial crisis.
Taiwan’s current long-term bond rating by Moody’s is Aa3.
Inappropriate sequencing of ﬁnancial deregulation and liberaliza-
tion, and the lack of prudential supervision of the ﬁnancial system, were
important factors contributing to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. In order to
implement ﬁnancial deregulation and liberalization, stability and the
proper sequencing of the steps for deregulation and liberalization are
required. Unfettered international capital mobility is not the best system
for all countries. The issue is one of proper sequencing. Capital markets
need supervisory and regulatory structures in place before broad-based
ﬁnancial deregulation and liberalization are introduced. While sound
ﬁscal and monetary policies and the avoidance of large current account
imbalances are necessary for the development of market economies, such
macro policies need to be accompanied by bankruptcy and secured
transactions regimes, and competent and maturing judicial and bank
regulatory and supervisory regimes.
Over the past decade many lessons have been learned in the
transition and emerging economies. Perhaps the most important is that
the development of market economies in these countries will be long-
term processes involving many steps. Another important lesson is that
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needs to be paid to such proper sequencing. Broad ﬁnancial liberalization
should not occur without the existence of a developing legal and
regulatory framework that contains, at a minimum, bankruptcy laws,
secured transactions laws, a functioning judicial system, and effective
banking regulation and supervision. While such important components
of a legal system do not have to be fully developed in order to begin
ﬁnancial deregulation and liberalization, the foundation for such a legal
system with these components as cornerstones needs to be in place as
such deregulation and liberalization are introduced. Just as it is easier to
build a dam before the water is ﬂowing, it is easier to put in place the
necessary legal and regulatory framework before the ﬁnancial system is
broadly deregulated and liberalized. Financial crises will still occur even
with the existence of a well-developed legal system—witness the U.S.
savings and loan crisis—but a developing and maturing legal system can
reduce the likelihood of a ﬁnancial crisis, can help prevent a correction in
the market from becoming a systemic ﬁnancial crisis, and can help
contain a spreading ﬁnancial crisis and so work to quickly rebuild
conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial system, which is necessary for a market
economy to function effectively and efﬁciently.
China’s legal and regulatory framework is the least developed of the
six countries that are the focus of this paper. Yet China did not suffer the
full consequences of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. The Chinese economy,
while slowing down during the crisis, continued to grow throughout the
crisis and the Chinese renminbi was not devalued. China’s current
long-term bond rating by Moody’s is A3. China’s experience during the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis reﬂects the fact that China’s ﬁnancial system has not
been deregulated and liberalized as much as the other East Asian
countries that suffered the full blow of the ﬁnancial crisis. Political and
other considerations may be behind the fact that China’s ﬁnancial system
has not been opened up as much as in other East Asian countries. But the
Chinese leadership now has the opportunity to follow a better and more
orderly sequencing of ﬁnancial deregulation and liberalization steps than
has been followed in other transition and emerging economies.
Both Russia and China have set their sights on the same end point—
a market-oriented economy. Never before in history have transitions been
undertaken on the scale and scope being undertaken in Russia and China.
However, the two countries are approaching the transition from a
state-planned to a market-oriented economy from very different paths.
The Chinese approach is top down, whereas the Russian approach is
bottom up. This author believes that China might well have followed
Russia’s bottom-up approach—with its apparent chaos accompanying
broad ﬁnancial deregulation and liberalization—if the Chinese leaders
had not themselves directly experienced the chaos of the Cultural
Revolution.
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economic reform, combined with the government’s high level of ﬁnancial
resources, including foreign exchange reserves, and the high degree of
state control over the economy and the ﬁnancial system, a systemic
ﬁnancial crisis should not be expected in China in the foreseeable future.
But the Chinese leadership must use this period to put in place the broad
infrastructure that is necessary for ﬁnancial stability. It is vitally impor-
tant that the legal and regulatory framework be signiﬁcantly strength-
ened in China as quickly as possible.
It is the view of this author that the bankruptcy and secured
transaction laws of Russia are sufﬁciently well developed. Russia also has
satisfactory commercial banking laws, central banking laws, and bank
insolvency laws. While each of these laws can certainly be improved,
Russia’s statutory framework for its ﬁnancial system is sufﬁciently well
developed. The Russian ﬁnancial regulatory authorities, particularly
within the Central Bank of Russia, have gained much sophistication since
1992. While in recent years the Central Bank of Russia as an institution
has lost much of the credibility and conﬁdence that it was building
during the earlier years of the transition, a cadre of personnel remain in
the Central Bank of Russia who well understand the techniques and tools
for effective banking regulation and supervision.
The problem for Russia is one of implementation. Russia needs to
build a common and collective interest among its citizens and to develop
a culture of law. It is this author’s belief that no country has greater
economic potential than Russia. A comparison of Russia and Japan is
illustrative. Russia has 20 million more people than Japan and has 45
times the land mass of Japan. Russia has more than one-half of the
world’s natural resources; Japan has very limited natural resources. Yet
Russia’s GDP is only one-ﬁfth the GDP of Japan. The global economy
would be signiﬁcantly stronger if Russia’s economy could meet its full
potential. The new Putin government has an historic opportunity to
exercise the political will that is required to implement the rule of law and
strengthen the culture of law in Russia that are essential for economic
growth and ﬁnancial stability.
CONCLUSION
A market economy requires stability and conﬁdence to operate
effectively and efﬁciently. The conﬁdence that is necessary to support the
ﬁnancial system of a market economy requires a well-developed legal
and regulatory framework. A vibrant market economy requires ﬁnancial
intermediation through the channeling of savings to creditworthy bor-
rowers in order to allow the entrepreneurial efforts of market participants
to develop more fully and rapidly. The word “credit” is derived from
French and Latin words that mean “to believe.” The legal and regulatory
60 John L. Walkerframework discussed in this paper is critical in establishing the basis for
such belief. A ﬁnancial sector that makes creditworthy loans is an
essential component of a market economy. The making of creditworthy
loans requires bankruptcy laws, secured transaction laws, the ability to
enforce contracts in courts, and banking regulation and supervision.
While the Asian and Russian ﬁnancial crises have receded, they have
triggered the recognition of the need for better infrastructure. Among the
most important infrastructure components of a market economy is a legal
and regulatory framework that is developing and maturing in a manner
that fosters and supports ﬁnancial stability. Certain important steps to
build such infrastructures have been taken, but they must continue.
APPENDIX:G UIDING PRINCIPLES AND CORE REQUIREMENTS
FOR A LEGAL SYSTEM IN A MARKET ECONOMY*
John L. Walker
The foundation of a market economy and its underlying legal system
is generally based on the premise that the public good results from
individual decisions in the market which allocate limited economic
resources under the constraints of supply and demand. In direct contrast,
the foundation of a centrally planned, command economy is generally
based on the premise that the individual good results from decisions by
public authorities which allocate limited economic resources according to
such authorities’ perception of the public good.
The legal systems of a market economy and a centrally planned,
command economy contain certain common elements, for example, the
need for criminal laws and their fair and predictable application by the
police and the courts. The awesome complexity and dynamism of a
market economy, however, require laws, rules, and norms, based on
transparency and openness, that encourage and facilitate economic
interchange and that at the same time take into account the fact that,
because market participants are human and thus not perfect, some degree
of governmental intervention in the “free” market is also required.
During the 1990s, market participants have examined on a more
comprehensive basis than before the institutional infrastructure required
by market economies. Such infrastructure, which developed in the
market economies as such economies themselves developed, had been
taken for granted. It has been recognized that the “hardware” of a market
economy includes (i) a stable medium of exchange, which requires
competent monetary authorities, (ii) creditworthy ﬁnancial institutions,
*Paper by John L. Walker in Change and Prosperity: The Aspen Institute Program on the
World Economy, 1998 Conference Report 31-39 (August 19-22, 1998).
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economy includes the rule of law that recognizes and protects well-
deﬁned private property rights (with respect to real, personal, and
intellectual property) and basic human rights.
The importance of the “culture of banking” has been recognized in
transition market contexts. Similarly, it is essential that the rule of law be
accompanied by, and indeed be rooted in, the culture of law: a culture
that supports the rule of law and opposes corruption, and a culture in
which the law is enforced by credible and honest authorities in a manner
that inspires public conﬁdence in the law and respect for the intentions of
the law. The rule of law based on the principle of “equal justice under
law” will nurture the culture of law. Without such a culture, a market
economy cannot function effectively.
Economic globalization is intensifying the focus by policymakers and
market participants on the rule of law. The rule of law in a society must
reﬂect the unique culture, history, and demographics of its people. While
certain universal values and precepts may underlie the rule of law,
rule-of-law reform cannot be imposed on a society and the will to reform
must come from within the society. The imposition by outside forces of
any value or precept as being universal will only result in resentment.
The rule of law must recognize and protect the rights of all market
participants. Such rights enable the value judgments of market partici-
pants to be converted through the legally protected market mechanism
into prices of goods and services and ﬁnancial instruments. For the
market mechanism to work effectively, the rule of law must include laws,
rules, and norms that encourage and facilitate the provision of timely and
accurate information to the public to allow market price adjustments.
Market-determined prices, which effectively facilitate the clearing of
markets, substitute for the decisions of public authorities in a centrally
planned, command economy. It is the market mechanism “hardware,”
supported by the rule of law “software,” that converts the changing
values of market participants into market signals (that is, prices) that
direct economic activity. Without this “software,” the “hardware” will
not work; the market mechanism will not function and governmental
intervention in the economy will lack necessary accountability and will
likely be arbitrary and unfair.
The ﬁnancial system of a market economy is the “central nervous
system” through which the market mechanism operates. The infrastruc-
ture of the ﬁnancial system must be supported by a comprehensive legal
and regulatory framework that provides for a stable medium of ex-
change, creditworthy ﬁnancial institutions, fair and honest capital mar-
kets, and efﬁcient payments, clearance, and settlement systems.
Experience, education, and technology induce continuous changes in
the relative productivity and value of economic inputs, resulting in what
the economist Joseph Schumpeter referred to as “creative destruction.”
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inputs to occur, which are not painless to market participants and which
result in the shifting of property rights among market participants. The
paradox of creative destruction is that it results in renewal of the market
economy, which has the ﬂexibility and strength to adjust to changes. This
renewal of the market economy is based on innovation, risk-taking, and
competition, all of which must be supported and encouraged by the rule
of law. Too heavy a hand of law and governmental regulation will stiﬂe
innovation; too light a hand will allow infringement of private property
rights. The cooperation and conﬁdence that are required for a market
economy to operate can only exist if the rule of law exists.
Globalized market forces, with their unforgiving nature and remark-
able speed, can no longer be controlled over the long term by govern-
ments. This has put enormous pressure on governmental and economic
structures in certain countries. Corrupt, authoritarian governments can-
not adjust to the demands of the global marketplace. Market economies
require governments that are law-abiding and fully accountable under
the rule of law. The period when authoritarian systems created stability
and thus promoted economic growth has been brought to an end by
globalized market forces. Systems that promote order over freedom will
not succeed over the long term. The rule of law that balances the
fundamental human desires for both freedom and order is required.
It should be recognized, however, that the transition to such a
balanced rule of law must be a gradual process in certain countries
because of their culture, history, and demographics. Otherwise, the chaos
that could result from abrupt change that threatens the existing political
order could be too destabilizing and thus harmful to the development of
a market economy. Nevertheless, over the longer term, the rule of law is
the natural antidote to chaos. While the sacriﬁces that are inherent in the
transition to market economies from centrally planned, command econ-
omies might lead some to seek authoritarian discipline during the
transition, the transition will not be successful over the long term without
the involvement, trust, and consensus of the people. Visionary and
inspiring leadership is important to the transition process, but such
leadership if unconstrained by the rule of law will almost certainly prove
in the end to be myopic if not despotic. The transition to a market
economy from a centrally planned, command economy may have disap-
pointing results during the early years, and after public enthusiasm has
dissipated much will depend on the acceptability, resilience, and vitality
of the rule of law. Law is a political and not an economic concept, but
economic reform should be grounded in legal reform and thus political
reform should accompany economic reform. The principles guiding
political reform must be based on the rule of law.
A market economy is by deﬁnition a system with checks and
balances. The rule of law in a market economy, which balances freedom
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planned, command economy does not have checks and balances built
into economic interactions or its governmental structure. Good govern-
ment, subject to checks and balances for necessary accountability, is a core
institutional requirement for a market economy.
If emerging market and transition economies want to participate in
the global marketplace, they will have to adopt rule-of-law reform with
the necessary corporate governance system that provides scrutiny of
corporate behavior. A comprehensive legal and regulatory framework
must support their developing ﬁnancial systems. The rule-of-law reform
must foster meritocracy and not favoritism. It must support decentralized
economic decision-making based on market prices derived in arm’s-
length interchanges and not based on cronyism and corruption. It must
require transparency and accountability of the market participants and
governmental authorities.
Based on the above discussion, set out below are guiding principles
for a legal system in a market economy, followed by core requirements
for such a legal system.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR A LEGAL SYSTEM
IN A MARKET ECONOMY
1. The legal system should be based on the premise that the public
good results from individual decisions in the market, which allocate
limited economic resources under the constraints of supply and demand.
2. The rule of law should recognize and protect well-deﬁned private
property rights (with respect to real, personal, and intellectual property)
and basic human rights.
3. The rule of law should balance the fundamental human desires for
both freedom and order.
4. Laws, rules, and norms, based on transparency and openness,
should encourage and facilitate economic interchange.
5. The rule of law should take into account that some degree of
governmental intervention in the “free” market is required. Too heavy a
hand of law and governmental regulation will stiﬂe innovation; too light
a hand will allow infringement of private property rights. Governmental
intervention in the market requires checks and balances for necessary
accountability and to prevent arbitrary and unfair actions. The govern-
ment should be law-abiding and fully accountable under the rule of law.
6. The culture of law that supports the rule of law and opposes
corruption should be nurtured in the society. The law should be enforced
in a manner that inspires public conﬁdence in the law and respect for the
intentions of the law.
7. The rule of law should reﬂect the unique culture, history, and
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from within the society.
8. The rule of law should foster meritocracy and support decentral-
ized economic decision-making based on market prices derived in
arm’s-length interchanges and not based on cronyism and corruption.
The market mechanism through which value judgments of market
participants are converted into prices of goods and services and ﬁnancial
instruments should be supported by the rule of law. Laws, rules, and
norms should encourage and facilitate the provision of timely and
accurate information to the public to allow market price adjustments.
9. The ﬁnancial system in a market economy should be supported by
a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework that provides for a
stable medium of exchange, creditworthy ﬁnancial institutions, fair and
honest capital markets, and efﬁcient payments, clearance, and settlement
systems.
10. The rule of law should support the shifting of property rights
among market participants that results from the “creative destruction”
inherent in market economies. The rule of law should support and
encourage innovation, risk-taking, and competition and lead to cooper-
ation and conﬁdence.
CORE REQUIREMENTS FOR A LEGAL SYSTEM
IN A MARKET ECONOMY
1. Laws that clearly deﬁne and protect private property rights (with
respect to real, personal, and intellectual property) are required.
2. Laws that clearly deﬁne and protect basic human rights are
required.
3. Administrative laws are required that prevent arbitrary and unfair
actions by governmental authorities.
4. Corporate laws that set corporate governance standards and
protect shareholders’ rights are required. The roles, rights, and respon-
sibilities of directors, managers, and shareholders must be legally de-
ﬁned.
5. Contract laws are required that protect the rights and enforce the
obligations of counterparties, including lenders and borrowers. A collat-
eral law that protects the rights of lenders through obtaining a pledge of
assets, including real property (mortgages), is required.
6. Laws that provide protection against fraud and unfair and
deceptive trade practices are required.
7. A competent, ethical, politically independent judiciary is required.
Such a judiciary must be supported by a sufﬁcient number of lawyers
with appropriate legal training and by credible and honest law enforce-
ment authorities.
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turings.
9. Governmental regulation and supervision, which form a part of
the rule of law, must support an environment in which counterparties can
effectively assess the risks of transactions.
10. The burden of managing risk in the ﬁnancial system should not
lie with private institutions alone. A central banking law is required that
establishes a politically independent but accountable central bank that is
mandated with the responsibility to maintain price stability and to act as
the “lender of last resort.”
11. Laws and regulations are required that create a comprehensive
legal framework for ﬁnancial institutions. The laws should address the
powers of such institutions, the minimum safety and soundness stan-
dards that they must meet, and their regulation and supervision on a
consolidated basis. Such laws must allow supervisors to set prudential
rules and regulations to control risks (including those covering capital
adequacy, loan loss reserves, asset concentrations, liquidity, risk manage-
ment, and internal controls), provide for the enforcement of such laws,
rules, and regulations, and address the resolution of problems in ﬁnancial
institutions, including insolvencies.
12. Laws that provide for a transparent, fair, and effective legal and
regulatory environment for capital markets are required, including laws
to protect investors and regulate the issuance of securities, broker-
dealers, and stock exchanges, and laws that provide for ﬁnancial trans-
parency through adequate disclosure, accounting, and auditing. Laws
and regulations governing collective investment vehicles (for example,
investment companies) are an important component of capital market
regulation.
13. Laws and regulations are required that govern the noncash
payments system and the clearance and settlement systems for securities
transactions, including depository and custodian facilities for securities.
14. Antitrust laws are required to prevent concentration of power
and collusive price setting. Such laws and their enforcement must seek to
foster competition and innovation.
15. Tax laws are required that are clear, fair, and predictable and that
provide the government with sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources to meet its
obligations and to provide a minimum social safety net.
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